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PROJECTING THE LONG ARM OF THE LAW: 
EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. ANTITRUST  
LAWS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
DORSEY D. ELLIS, JR.* 
More than a dozen years ago, the nuclear engineer turned management 
consultant and business pundit, Kenichi Ohmae, predicted that “sooner 
than most people think, our belief in the ‘nationality’ of most corporations 
will seem quaint. It is already out of date.”1 His prophecy largely has been 
fulfilled. McDonald’s and Starbucks are ubiquitous, thriving on main 
streets and malls around the globe. A former “big three” U.S. automobile 
manufacturer is now a German-American corporation, while the 
quintessentially British Jaguar is manufactured by Ford. Then there is the 
Seattle Mariners professional baseball team—and what could be more 
American than baseball?—financed by Nintendo and starring Ichiro 
Suzuki and Kazuhiro Sasaki. The examples are endless. 
Ohmae was writing before the advent of the Internet, at a time when 
the term “E-commerce” had yet to be coined. Yet, he observed that the 
new world order already contained contradictions: “On a political map, the 
boundaries between countries are as clear as ever. But on a competitive 
map, a map showing the real flows of financial and industrial activity, 
those boundaries have largely disappeared.”2 That observation captures the 
source of the problem discussed in this paper. While the globalization of 
business has accelerated, the political paradigm fundamentally remains the 
nineteenth century nation-state.3  
 * William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law, Washington University School of 
Law. This Article is a revised version of a paper delivered at the APEC Competition Policy and 
Economic Development Conference, the Center for Global Partnership, the Institute of Comparative 
Law, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan. I am grateful to the conference participants for their comments 
on the paper as delivered, and also to Todd Alfuth, Washington University School of Law class of 
2003, for his invaluable research assistance. 
 1. KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD 10 (1990). 
 2. Id. at 18. 
 3. The European Community (EC) might be cited as an exception to this statement. The 
European Commission’s Competition Directorate-General has developed a strong and effective 
community-wide enforcement regime that has not just supplemented national competition law 
enforcement efforts, but has been well ahead of most member states in aggressively enforcing the 
competition provisions of the Treaties. Several member states did not even have competition laws, 
much less effective enforcement agencies, until quite recently. EC competition law enforcement 
occurs in the unique context of pervasive economic unification in the EC, which gives to the EC many 
of the attributes we associate with a nation-state. See generally PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, 
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Under these circumstances, nations are confronted with three choices. 
They may: (a) permit business to function unhampered by any 
governmentally-imposed ground rules; (b) expand the reach of national 
regulatory schemes to cover multinational business activities; or (c) create 
multinational legal institutions that can regulate multinational business 
activities effectively. 
In the area of competition—or antitrust—regulation, policymakers are 
not likely to embrace the first alternative, a kind of global laissez faire. 
Regulations have made tentative moves in the direction of the third 
alternative, the creation of a multinational enforcement regime, under the 
auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO) or otherwise.4 But for 
now, the method of choice is the second option, the expansion of 
municipal law jurisdiction to reach multinational activity. The United 
States has been at the forefront of this effort, providing an example that 
some other international political players are beginning to follow. 
In this paper, I review the development, expansion, and current state of 
extraterritorial enforcement in the United States, look briefly at the 
presence or prospects of extraterritorial jurisdiction elsewhere, identify 
some of the problems presented by the unilateral exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and suggest a view of the future. 
I. 
The last decade of the twentieth century saw a veritable explosion in 
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the enforcement of U.S. 
antitrust laws by the United States. Simultaneously, the Antitrust Division 
increased the use of criminal sanctions against foreign firms and 
individuals, as well as the severity of the sanctions imposed. The table in 
Appendix A lists fines of $10 million or more assessed for antitrust 
violations. Observe that the first fine of such magnitude was assessed in 
1996 and that twenty-seven of the thirty-two defendants listed are non-
U.S. corporations. These developments may indeed reflect “a case-by-case 
common law process of law development” heralding the “emergence of 
international competition law,” as Professor Harry First has suggested.5 
EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 891-1025 (2d ed. 1998); D.G. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION 
LAW (3d ed. 1998). 
 4. See, e.g., Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the Proposed International Antitrust Code, in 
ANTITRUST: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY? 345-57 (John O. Haley & Hiroshi Iyori eds., 
1995). 
 5. Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International 
Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 733-34 (2001). 
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Or, they may represent an example of “U.S. legislative and judicial 
imperialism,” as characterized by former Commissioner of the Australian 
Trade Practices Commission, Warren Pengilley.6  
In any event, the head of the Antitrust Division for most of the Clinton 
administration saw this expansive enforcement effort as a sterling 
accomplishment of his tenure. Proclaiming “the dawn of a new era in anti-
cartel enforcement around the world,”7 Assistant Attorney General Joel 
Klein announced that the Antitrust Division had collected more fines in 
fiscal year 1999 than in the entire history of Sherman Act prosecutions.8 
The $1.1 billion collected equaled a nearly fourfold increase over the 
record setting amount obtained in 1998. Significantly, more than 90% of 
the fines assessed by the Division in 1997 and 1998, and almost all the 
criminal fines obtained in 1999, came from international cartel cases. The 
largest fines were assessed against non-U.S. firms. A single $500 million 
fine assessed against one Swiss firm in 1999 exceeded the totals collected 
in any previous year and was, at the time, “the largest fine ever secured in 
any Justice Department proceeding under any statute.”9 In addition, a “$10 
million fine [was] imposed on the German CEO of SGL Carbon AG,”10 
and the Department of Justice negotiated “precedent-setting agreements by 
two European executives to plead guilty and go to jail in the U.S.”11 
During the two preceding fiscal years, approximately 50% of the corporate 
criminal antitrust defendants were non-United States entities,12 and of the 
twenty-six corporations against which fines of $10 million or more were 
assessed, about half were foreign-based.13 Moreover, some thirty-five 
grand juries then were investigating international cartels, evidencing a 
continued emphasis on international enforcement of U.S. municipal 
antitrust laws.  
The process continued during the transition from the Clinton 
administration to the Bush administration. During fiscal year 2000, nearly 
 6. Warren Pengilley, The Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Trade Laws: Is It Not Time for “ET” 
to “Go Home”?, 20 WORLD COMPETITION L. AND ECON. REV., Mar. 1997, at 54. 
 7. Joel I. Klein, The War Against International Cartels: Lessons from the Battlefront, Address at 
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 26th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy 
2 (Oct. 14, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3747.htm. 
 8. See id. at 6. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 7. 
 11. Id. at 6. 
 12. Joel I. Klein, Status Report: International Cartel Enforcement, Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute 26th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy (Oct. 14, 1999). 
 13. Joel Klein, Status Report: Criminal Fines, Fordham Corporate Law Institute 26th Annual 
Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy (Oct. 14, 1999). 
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one-third of the Antitrust Division’s criminal investigations involved 
suspected international cartel activity, and the Division was pursuing thirty 
grand jury investigations of suspected international cartel activity.14 A 
$134 million fine was assessed against Mitsubishi Corporation in 2001 for 
its participation in the international graphite electrodes price fixing 
cartel.15 Others prosecuted in that case (and the fines imposed upon them) 
were: SGL Carbon AG of Wiesbaden, Germany (fined $135 million); 
UCAR International Inc. of Danbury, Connecticut (fined $110 million); 
Showa Denko Carbon Inc. of Ridgeville, South Carolina (fined $32.5 
million); Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. of Tokyo, Japan (fined $6 million); SEC 
Corporation of Hyogo, Japan (fined $4.8 million); and Nippon Carbon Co. 
Ltd. of Tokyo, Japan (fined $2.5 million).16 In another case, a 
Milan-based, Swiss subsidiary of ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. pleaded 
guilty and was assessed a $53 million fine for participating in a bid rigging 
conspiracy on a construction contract funded by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) in Egypt.17  
Corporations are not the only non-U.S. entities being sanctioned. 
Executives from Germany and Switzerland recently have served prison 
sentences in the United States following convictions of antitrust 
violations.18 The U.K. chairman of Christie’s, the prestigious British 
auction house, has been indicted along with his American alleged co-
conspirator, the chairman of Sotheby’s, on charges that they fixed 
commissions on auction items.19 Also, four Japanese citizens, officers in 
Japanese chemical companies, were indicted recently for allegedly 
participating in a conspiracy to fix prices of food additives (sorbates).20 
What, one may ask, accounts for these remarkable and unprecedented 
 14. James M. Griffin, Status Report on Criminal Fines, International Cartel Enforcement, and the 
Corporate Leniency Program, Address Before the Criminal Practice and Procedure Committee, 49th 
Annual Spring Meeting, American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law (Mar. 28, 2001), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/8063.htm. 
 15. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Mitsubishi Corporation Fined $134 Million for Its Role 
in International Price-Fixing Cartel (May 10, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
press_releases/2001/8186.htm. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. Subsidiary Pleads Guilty 
to Bid Rigging on USAID Constsruction Contract in Egypt (Apr. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ atr/public/press_releases/2001/7984.htm. 
 18. See Griffin, supra note 14. 
 19. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Chairman of Sotheby’s and Christie’s Auction 
Houses Indicted in International Price-Fixing Conspiracy (May 2, 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov /atr/public/press_releases/2001/8128.htm. 
 20. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Four Japanese Executives Indicted in Price-Fixing 
Conspiracy (Jan. 23, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/ 
7310.htm. 
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results during the 1990s? There are a number of contributing factors. First, 
almost all of the cases were concluded through negotiated pleas rather than 
trials.21 Second, although the Sherman Act, as amended through 1990, 
provides for criminal fines not exceeding $10 million for corporations and 
$350,000 (as well as imprisonment for up to three years) for individuals,22 
the Division increasingly has relied upon the alternative fine calculation 
authorized by the Criminal Fines Improvement Act of 1987, which permits 
fines against both corporations and individuals equal to twice the gain or 
twice the loss occasioned by the offense.23 The resolution of cases through 
plea agreements removes the formidable difficulties facing the government 
in proving the gains/losses attributable to the antitrust violations.24 
Third, all of the cases involved charges of horizontal price fixing. 
These per se violations of the Sherman Act do not require a showing of 
economic effect25 and, hence, required neither proof of market definition 
nor the presence of market power. Thus, defendants had fewer bases on 
which to challenge the government’s case, and faced a greater risk of 
conviction if brought to trial before an American jury.  
 21. The only criminal prosecution of a non-U.S. defendant through trial occurred in the fax paper 
cases. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 62 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Mass. 1999); infra notes 
86-100 and accompanying text. In the ADM case, two executives of that company, both U.S. citizens, 
were prosecuted through trial and ultimately received substantial prison sentences. See United States v. 
Andreas, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000). See generally KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT (2000) 
(providing a fascinating account of the unraveling of the ADM case, which also involved Japanese and 
European companies). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The Department of Justice has sought to increase the maximum to 
$100 million. See Joel Klein, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and 
Competition Committee on the Judiciary, Concerning International Antitrust Enforcement (Oct. 2, 
1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/1971.htm. 
 23. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1994): 
Alternative fine based on gain or loss.—If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or 
if the offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be 
fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of 
a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process. 
 24. See, e.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. BASF Aktiengesellschaft, Crim. No. 399-CR-
200-R 5-7 (May 20, 1990), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2400/basf.pdf. Negotiated 
pleas typically contain language to the effect that the defendant agrees that the Sentencing Guidelines 
range exceeds the agreed-upon fine. See id. at 7. The base fine for Guideline purposes usually is 
calculated at 20% of sales volume, apparently a rule of thumb for estimating twice the gain or loss. See 
Gary R. Spratling, Transparency in Enforcement Maximizes Cooperation from Antitrust Offenders, 
Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 26th Annual Conference on International Antitrust 
Law & Policy (Oct. 15, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3952.htm. 
 25. Ordinarily, effect is not necessary to convict a U.S. defendant of price fixing. See United 
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). But cf. Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad. System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). Whether a showing of economic effect is essential 
to finding a non-U.S. defendant guilty of a price fixing conspiracy where the operative acts all 
transpired outside the United States is a more complex issue. See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying 
text. 
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The Antitrust Division’s successful efforts to strengthen its antitrust 
enforcement weapons also contributed to its success in obtaining 
convictions. Increasingly, the Division has utilized informants, search 
warrants, electronic surveillance (including wiretapping, video monitoring, 
and body wires), and the investigative resources of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and other law enforcement agencies.26 It has developed 
and refined a sophisticated corporate leniency program that provides 
significant inducement for both corporations and their employees to 
provide evidence of violations to the Division.27 It has negotiated an 
effective border watch arrangement with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to detain foreign individuals who might have 
information related to investigations.28 And, it has signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the INS that provides incentives for cooperation by 
foreign business executives.29 
International cooperation is noticeably absent from this list of factors 
that contributed to the Antitrust Division’s success in prosecuting non-
U.S. corporations and individuals. Although the Division has pursued a 
policy it calls “positive comity,”30 under which it has entered into 
cooperation agreements with Australia,31 Canada,32 Japan,33 and the 
European Community,34 these agreements played an insignificant role in 
 26. See Judy Whalley, Priorities and Practices—The Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement 
Program, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 571 (1988). See also EICHENWALD, supra note 21. 
 27. See Spratling, supra note 24, at 5. 
 28. Donald C. Klawiter, Criminal Antitrust Comes to the Global Market, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 201, 208-09 (1998). 
 29. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Antitrust Division, United States Department of 
Justice and The Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Department of Justice (Mar. 15, 
1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/criminal/9951.pdf. See also Klawiter, supra note 
28, at 206-07. 
 30. See Anne K. Bingaman, U.S. Antitrust Policies in World Trade, Address Before the World 
Trade Center Chicago Seminar on GATT After Uruguay (May 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/94-05-16.txt; Joel I. Klein, International Antitrust: A Justice 
Department Perspective, Address Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Oct. 26, 1995), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/fordhamjik.txt. See also International 
Competition Policy Advisory Committee, Final Report to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust 201-79 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm 
[hereinafter Final Report]. 
 31. Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-Austl. 34 
U.S.T. 388, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/austral.us.txt. 
 32. Agreement Regarding the Application of Their Competition and Deceptive Marketing 
Practices Laws, Aug. 1-3, 1995, U.S.-Can., 35 I.L.M. 309, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
public/international/docs/uscan721.pdf. 
 33. Agreement Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities, Oct. 7, 1999, U.S.-Japan, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/3740.pdf. 
 34. Agreement on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their 
Competition Laws, June 4, 1998, U.S.-E.C., State Dep’t No. 98-106, 37 I.L.M. 1070, available at 
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prosecuting non-U.S. defendants.35 
The Antitrust Division’s success in prosecuting foreign firms and 
individuals benefited from negotiated pleas, expanded fines, and its 
newfound ability to deploy a powerful set of enforcement tools. However, 
these alone would not have produced such dramatic results. It first was 
necessary to establish the jurisdictional foundation for prosecuting non-
U.S. firms and individuals for acts that occurred entirely outside the 
United States. 
The development of a legal foundation for extraterritorial jurisdiction 
to enforce U.S. antitrust laws got off to a slow start. The Sherman Act by 
its terms reaches “trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations,”36 but Justice Holmes’ decision in American Banana Co. 
v. United Fruit Co., a narrow reading of international law’s territorial 
jurisdiction concept, seemed to limit the reach of U.S. antitrust laws to acts 
committed within the United States.37 Only two years later, in one of the 
leading cases under the statute, The Imperial Tobacco Company of Great 
Britain and Ireland was prosecuted and found to have conspired with The 
American Tobacco Company and other U.S. corporations and individuals 
not to compete in each other’s primary markets.38 The agreement at issue 
evidently was concluded in England, although U.S. firms participated.  
Nineteenth century jurists generally agreed that the international law 
principle of territorial jurisdiction limited the reach of national law, other 
than in exceptional cases such as piracy on the high seas, to the territory of 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/1781.htm. See also Agreement Regarding the 
Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., 30 I.L.M. 1491, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/ec.htm. 
 35. Apparently, Japan provided some assistance in the fax paper cases, but may not have realized 
that a criminal prosecution would result. See Joel Davidow, Recent Developments in the 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 20 WORLD COMPETITION L. AND ECON. REV., Mar. 
1997, at 8. The Government of Japan appeared as amicus in the case, supporting defendant’s assertion 
of lack of jurisdiction to prosecute the case in the United States. See United States v. Nippon Paper 
Indus. Co., 109 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998). No cooperation was sought 
or obtained from the home countries of the defendants in the vitamin cases, but Canada and the United 
States apparently did cooperate in the prosecution. See First, supra note 5, at 717-18. The Antitrust 
Division press releases announcing success in the remaining cases do not mention international 
assistance. 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001). 
 37. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Two years later, in a case 
involving a crime committed in one U.S. state with effects in another, Holmes held that the latter had 
jurisdiction. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (stating “[a]cts done outside a 
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in 
punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in 
getting him within its power.”). 
 38. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). Curiously, the Supreme 
Court’s opinion neither cited American Banana nor discussed the extraterritorial jurisdiction issue. 
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the enforcing nation.39 Thus, Justice Holmes’ invocation of this 
international law principle in American Banana40 as a limitation on the 
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act arguably was consistent with the 
views prevalent when the statute was adopted two decades earlier. 
Chief Justice Marshall cautioned against construing a federal statute in 
a manner inconsistent with international law principles.41 But, that advice 
is more easily given than implemented. The development of extraterritorial 
application of U.S. antitrust law subsequent to American Banana 
illustrates the malleability of the jurisdictional principles of customary 
international law. Although quoted by Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co. v. California, Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition 
retains little force. As the Ninth Circuit recently observed, “the Supreme 
Court has never invoked Charming Betsy against the United States in a 
suit in which it was a party.”42 The Supreme Court, in its 1991 decision in 
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., did invoke the “longstanding 
principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary 
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States.’”43 By then, however, it was “well established that the 
Sherman Act applies extraterritorially.”44 
At least since the publication of the Harvard Study45 in 1935, 
international lawyers have acknowledged that customary international law 
recognizes several principles that support extraterritorial jurisdiction: the 
“protective,” “universality,” “nationality,” and “passive personality” 
principles. Commentators46 and U.S. courts47 continue to cite these 
principles. Could one or more of them be invoked to reach anticompetitive 
acts outside the United States that affect the American economy or 
citizens? The protective principle, which permits a nation to exercise 
jurisdiction to protect its important state interests, seems applicable on its 
face. However, it ordinarily is restricted to situations where critical 
national interests, such as national security or the national currency, are 
 39. MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 323 (3d ed. 1999). 
 40. American Banana Co. v United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
 41. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[a]n act of congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.”). 
 42. United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1179 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 43. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 44. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 45. Research in International Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, 
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 443, 445 (Supp. 1935). 
 46. JANIS, supra note 39, at 322-30. 
 47. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988). 
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threatened.48 Arguably, the United States could invoke the passive 
personality principle, which authorizes a nation to assert jurisdiction over 
anyone who injures any of its citizens in violation of its laws, regardless of 
where the harm occurs. However, that principle is the most controversial 
of the group and “traditionally has been an anathema to United States 
lawmakers”49 (although it was relied upon in part in a case of air piracy 
involving some U.S. citizens50). The other principles clearly are 
inapplicable.51 
Thus, U.S. courts must premise their jurisdiction on the territorial 
principle to avoid conflict with international law. The plasticity of 
international law principles comes into play here, for the concept of 
“objective territoriality” extends the territorial principle to encompass 
conduct outside the territorial boundaries that has effects within them. As 
the Permanent International Court of Justice observed in The S.S. “Lotus” 
(France v. Turkey), “the courts of many countries . . . interpret criminal 
law in the sense that offenses are . . . regarded as having been committed 
in the national territory, if one of the constituent elements . . . more 
especially its effects, have taken place there.”52 Today, the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which is accepted as an authoritative 
statement of international law principles,53 expressly recognizes intended 
and actual effects as a basis for invoking jurisdiction in antitrust cases.54  
The issue of the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act remained 
largely dormant for three decades after American Banana,55 until Judge 
Learned Hand squarely confronted it in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
 48. JANIS, supra note 39, at 329. See United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th 
Cir. 1979); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968). See also IAIN CAMERON, THE 
PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 4-5 (1994). 
 49. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902. 
 50. Id. at 903. 
 51. The nationality principle recognizes the jurisdiction of a state to prosecute its citizens for 
violating its laws, no matter where the violation may occur. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 
U.S. 421 (1932). The universality principle, which accords jurisdiction to try the accused to any state 
that obtains custody over the accused, was applied originally against piracy on the high seas. Today it 
is used to prosecute “crimes against humanity.” See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571, 582-
83 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). 
 52. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 23 (Sept. 7) (holding that a tortious 
act committed in one jurisdiction with injurious effects occurring in another gives rise to concurrent 
jurisdiction). 
 53. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 415(2) (1986). 
 55. But see United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). In addition, Professor First 
has unearthed a series of prosecutions brought by Thurman Arnold during 1939-42 that involved non-
U.S. corporations as defendants. See First, supra note 5, at 729-30. 
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America.56 He held that Aluminium Limited, a Canadian corporation, 
violated the Sherman Act by participating in the “Alliance,” a cartel 
composed primarily of European companies who agreed to limit their 
aluminum ingot production. Neither Alcoa nor any other U.S. company 
was found to have participated in the cartel. Judge Hand’s statement of the 
issue makes clear that he viewed the reach of the Sherman Act purely as a 
question of U.S. law. “[T]he only question open is whether Congress 
intended to impose . . . liability [to conduct outside the United States of 
persons not in allegiance to it], and whether our own Constitution 
permitted it to do so: as a court of the United States, we cannot look 
beyond our own law.”57 
However, he did not, “impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom 
its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the 
United States.”58 He concluded that such cartels were violations of the 
Sherman Act “if they were intended to affect imports [into the United 
States] and did affect them.”59 As the government unquestionably had 
shown intent, concluded Judge Hand, the burden shifted to the defendant 
to show lack of effect.60 Thus, notwithstanding Hand’s statement 
seemingly requiring both intent and actual affect, proof of intent to affect 
U.S. commerce is, by itself, sufficient to make out a prima facie case; 
actual effects (or their absence) apply only as an affirmative defense. 
The “effects” principle laid down in Aluminum Co. is derived from the 
international law concept of territorial jurisdiction.61 Judge Hand’s stated 
test for extraterritorial jurisdiction—intent plus some effect on 
commerce—became the standard, although its formulation has varied in 
subsequent judicial decisions.62 While Judge Hand inferred effects from 
 56. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 57. Id. at 443. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 444. 
 60. Id. 
 61. JANIS, supra note 39, at 326 (stating “[e]xtraterritorial though it may be in practice, in theory 
the effects principle is grounded on the principle of territorial jurisdiction.”). See also Chua Han Mow 
v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[t]here is no constitutional bar to the 
extraterritorial application of penal laws.”). 
 62. See Daniel T. Murphy, Moderating Antitrust Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act and the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Revised), 54 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 779, 806 (1986) (“Judge Hand’s intent, coupled with some effect on United States commerce 
standard, as articulated in [Aluminum Co.], has been reformulated in myriad ways. Among other 
variants, it has become an effects only test, a direct or substantial effects test, a direct and substantial 
effects test, and a some effects, regardless of whether they are intended or substantial, test.” [footnotes 
omitted]). See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 610-13 
(9th Cir. 1976). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/19
p477 Ellis book pages.doc  10/15/02   3:22 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] PROJECTING THE LONG ARM OF THE LAW 487 
 
 
 
 
 
intent, in most subsequent cases the courts have looked for actual effects 
and have given little attention to evidence of intent. In the Antitrust Guide 
for International Operations, promulgated in 1977, the Antitrust Division 
adopted the “substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce” as the 
test for jurisdiction over foreign transactions.63 Congress stepped in with 
the passage of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 
(FTAIA),64 which adopted a “direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect . . . on trade or commerce . . .,” as applied to export 
commerce.65 The Antitrust Division adopted this language in its revised 
international guidelines for imports and mergers.66 
Whether courts applying the Aluminum Co. standard (in any of its 
variations) should also consider other nations’ interests—i.e., whether 
comity considerations should affect the exercise of territorial 
jurisdiction—remained a matter of dispute.67 The Ninth Circuit in 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America said they should;68 the 
Antitrust Division, however, argued that only where compliance with U.S. 
antitrust laws created an actual conflict with other nations’ laws did 
questions of comity come into play.69 The Supreme Court resolved the 
issue in its 1993 decision in Hartford Fire.70 The Court concluded that “it 
is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct 
that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect 
in the United States,”71 thereby embracing the Division’s position. 
In Hartford Fire, plaintiffs alleged that, at the request of several U.S. 
insurance companies, a group of London reinsurers met and agreed that all 
reinsurance contracts covering North American casualty risks would 
exclude specified liability coverage. The London reinsurers argued that the 
district court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction under the 
principle of international comity. They asserted that Parliament had 
 63. Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations 7 
(1977), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (Feb. 1, 1977). 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000). 
 65. “This cumbersome and inelegant language means that the antitrust laws do not apply to 
domestic or foreign conduct affecting foreign markets, consumers, or producers unless there is a direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the domestic market.” PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 272h2 (2000). 
 66. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations § 4 
(1988), reprinted in 55 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1391, at S-1, S-20-21. 
 67. “The effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations’ interests.” 
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611-12. 
 68. Id. at 613. 
 69. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 66, § 5. 
 70. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 71. Id. at 796. 
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established a regulatory regime over the London reinsurance market and 
that their conduct was consistent with British law and policy. The 
Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that no conflict with 
British law existed because British law did not require the reinsurers to 
perform any act prohibited by U.S. law, nor was compliance with the laws 
of both countries impossible. 
The Hartford Fire decision, although controversial at the time,72 
removed any legal impediment to antitrust enforcement against foreign 
firms (and, by implication, individuals), at least in civil cases where U.S. 
firms also were charged with participating in the violation. The first 
appellate court decision to consider whether the same standard applied to 
criminal prosecution of non-U.S. firms for acts that occurred wholly 
outside the territorial boundaries of the United States was United States v. 
Nippon Paper Industries Co.73 “Between the 1945 [Aluminum Co.] 
decision and the 1997 Nippon Paper decision, there was no reported case 
in which an attempt was made to apply U.S. antitrust law to conduct 
engaged in entirely outside the United States by non-Americans.”74 
In Nippon Paper, the First Circuit held that the United States could 
prosecute a foreign corporation under the Sherman Act for activities that 
took place entirely outside the United States, if they were intended to and 
did have effects within the United States. The indictment charged that the 
defendant conspired with others in 1990 to raise prices for thermal fax 
paper in the United States by agreeing to sell it to independent trading 
companies on the condition that the latter would resell it in North America 
at inflated prices. It also charged that the alleged conspirators agreed to 
monitor the resales to confirm that the trading companies were adhering to 
the higher prices.75 Concluding that “the criminal provisions of the 
Sherman Act do not apply to conspiratorial conduct in which none of the 
overt acts of the conspiracy take place in the United States,” the District 
 72. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire 
Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289. 
 73. 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1998). 
 74. Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 505, 513 (1998). 
 75. The charge raises the obvious question why the manufacturers would pressure the 
independent trading companies to charge higher prices in the United States. For a fungible commodity 
such as fax paper, with a presumably downward sloping demand curve, manufacturers ordinarily 
would want the traders to resell it at a price equal to the traders’ marginal cost, thereby maximizing the 
quantity demanded by the traders from the manufacturers. Absent explanation, the charged conduct 
“makes no economic sense” and is therefore “implausible.” See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). As came out in the evidence at the subsequent trial, however, 
there was an explanation. See infra text accompanying notes 92-95. 
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Court granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion.76 The Court of 
Appeals reversed and reinstated the indictment. But its reasoning is 
vulnerable, and the underlying facts reinforce reservations about the 
propriety of prosecuting such cases in the United States under U.S. law. 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that federal statutes are presumed 
to reach only those acts that take place within the territorial jurisdiction, 
absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary.77 The court concluded 
that, as to civil antitrust suits, Hartford Fire78 had resolved the issue: 
Congress intended the Sherman Act to reach “foreign conduct that was 
meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the 
United States.”79 The court declined to distinguish Hartford Fire on the 
ground that it was a civil treble damage action. It concluded that as civil 
suits and criminal prosecutions for extraterritorial acts are “based on the 
same language in the same section of the same statute,” both “common 
sense” and “accepted canons of statutory construction” require that the 
statute should be interpreted uniformly in civil and criminal cases.80 
Hartford Fire had found clear congressional intent to apply the Sherman 
Act extraterritorially in civil actions, and it would be “disingenuous” to 
interpret the same statutory language differently in a criminal 
proceeding.81 
Having reached this conclusion, the court had little difficulty in 
rejecting the arguments of the defendant and the Government of Japan 
(which appeared as amicus). These arguments were lack of precedent, a 
stronger presumption against extraterritorial criminal prosecutions, the 
position taken by the Restatement,82 the rule of lenity,83 and comity. 
 76. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Supp. 55, 66 (D. Mass. 1996). 
 77. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 78. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 79. Id. at 796. 
 80. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 81. Id. at 6. This conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the holding in United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 n.19 (1978) (“Congress was fully aware of the traditional 
distinctions between the elements of civil and criminal offenses and apparently did not intend to do 
away with them in the Act.”). The court brushed Gypsum aside with the observation that “[r]educed to 
bare essence, Gypsum focuses on mens rea, noting that centuries of Anglo-American legal tradition 
instruct that criminal liability ordinarily should be premised on malevolent intent, . . . [but] [t]here is 
simply no comparable tradition or rationale for drawing a criminal/civil distinction with regard to 
extraterritoriality . . . ” Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d at 7. 
 82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 cmt. f (1996). In the case of 
regulatory statutes such as the antitrust laws, “legislative intent to subject conduct outside the state’s 
territory to its criminal law should be found only on the basis of express statement or clear 
implication.” Id. 
 83. “The rule . . . provides that, in the course of interpreting statutes in criminal cases, a 
reviewing court should resolve ambiguities affecting a statute’s scope in the defendant’s favor . . . But 
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The court rejected the defendant’s and Japan’s comity argument on the 
basis of Hartford Fire, which had held comity applicable only where a 
defendant could not comply simultaneously with both U.S. law and the 
law of the relevant foreign sovereign.84 That clearly was not the case 
because, in the court’s view, the defendant’s alleged conduct also was 
unlawful under the law of Japan.85 
Following a trial on remand, in which the jury was unable to reach a 
verdict, District Judge Gertner granted the defendant’s motion for 
dismissal of the indictment.86 She found that the evidence supported the 
allegation that some Japanese manufacturers conspired to fix the price of 
fax paper in the United States and that defendant Nippon was a part of that 
conspiracy. However, she also found that the defendant withdrew from the 
conspiracy prior to the beginning of the limitations period, with the result 
that the government failed to carry its burden. Several aspects of the 
opinion are germane to the larger issues involved.  
First, “concerns about comity and the exigencies of a criminal 
prosecution [of non-U.S. firms] . . . figured prominently in the actual trial. 
Fundamental issues about language and meaning—which inferences were 
the rule of lenity is inapposite unless a statutory ambiguity looms . . .” and the Hartford Fire decision 
forecloses any argument that the Sherman Act lacks extraterritorial reach. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 
109 F.3d at 7-8. 
 84. “Comity is more an aspiration than a fixed rule, more a matter of grace than a matter of 
obligation. In all events, its growth in the antitrust sphere has been stunted by Hartford Fire . . .” Id. at 
8. 
 85. Id. No citation is offered by the court for the proposition that the defendants’ conduct was 
illegal under Japanese law. The Japanese Antimonopoly Law does contain a general prohibition 
against price fixing. Act Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of 
Fair Trade, Act No. 54 of 1947, § 2(6) [hereinafter Antimonopoly Law], reprinted in HIROSHI IYORI & 
AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN app. A, at 387 (1994). 
The term “unreasonable restraint of trade” as used in this Act shall mean such business activities, 
by which any entrepreneur, by contract, agreement or any other concerted actions, irrespective of 
its names, with other entrepreneurs, mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in such a 
manner as to fix, maintain, or increase prices, or to limit production, technology, products, 
facilities, or customers or suppliers, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial 
restraint of competition in any particular field of trade.  
Id. See also id. § 3 (stating “[n]o entrepreneur shall effect private monopolization or unreasonable 
restraint of trade.”). 
 However, until 1997, the Export and Import Transactions Law gave the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (MITI) the authority to approve voluntary export cartels, which were exempt from 
Antimonopoly Law enforcement. See JOHN HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: THE FIRST 
FIFTY YEARS, 1947-1998 56, 83-84, 194 n.45 (2001). As Professor Haley notes, “export cartels often 
reflected a Japanese response to pressures from foreign governments, especially in the United States, 
against dumping or voluntary export restraints as exemplified in automobile exports . . . ” Id. at 84. As 
the subsequent trial made evident, Professor Haley’s description fits the situation involved in Nippon 
Paper. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
 86. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 62 F. Supp. 2d 173, 196 (D. Mass. 1999). 
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reasonable and which were not in light of Japanese culture and 
traditions—permeated the case.”87 Specifically, the translators retained by 
the government and the defendant, respectively, disagreed over the correct 
English translation of critical terms used in the discussions between 
representatives of the Japanese manufacturers,88 and the testimony of the 
“government’s star witness” had to be taken via video teleconferencing 
between Tokyo and Boston each evening at 6:00 p.m. Boston time.89 One 
government witness acknowledged westerners’ difficulties in 
comprehending “shared values that the Japanese have” that may be 
implicit in their dealings with each other.90 Yet, as the court noted, jurors 
are expected to draw inferences from their “shared perceptions.” If 
relevant Japanese perceptions are different, she concluded, the defendant 
has the burden of presenting evidence on that issue to the jury.91  
Second, the evidence revealed that the impetus for the meeting between 
the Japanese manufacturers’ representatives was a threat by an American 
manufacturer to institute an anti-dumping proceeding against them, 
charging them with pricing their products in the United States “below their 
fair value.”92 As the judge observed, “there was the aroma of a setup in all 
of this by the American companies . . .”93 The Japanese manufacturers 
lawfully could meet to devise their strategy in response to this threat—
they could even discuss prices—and each manufacturer could decide 
independently to concur in the pricing strategy of its rivals.94 However, 
they could not agree to fix the prices they would charge in the North 
American market. Note the dilemma faced by the defendant and its alleged 
co-conspirators. If they failed to respond to the threat to initiate 
proceedings before the United States International Trade Commission, 
they could find themselves involved in costly litigation that could end in 
the assessment of punitive tariffs on their products, which would raise the 
prices charged in the American market. On the other hand, if their strategy 
discussions crossed the fine line that defines impermissible agreement, or 
appeared to do so, they would be subject to an antitrust suit or prosecution. 
Thus, the Japanese paper manufacturers were confronted with a situation 
where “the behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act is . . . difficult to 
 87. Id. at 178. 
 88. Id. at 184-85 & n.21. 
 89. Id. at 184 n.18. 
 90. Id. at 183 n.16. 
 91. Id. at 183 n.15. 
 92. Id. at 180. 
 93. Id. at 180 n.12. 
 94. Id. at 180 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984)). 
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distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically 
justifiable business conduct,”95 precisely the situation that led the Court in 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co. to differentiate between civil 
actions and criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act. 
Third, the definition of “effects” adopted by the trial court raises 
concerns. The jurisdictional basis for the prosecution was that the charged 
conduct was “intended to have, and did in fact have, substantial effects in 
this country.”96 However, price fixing is a per se offense under the 
antitrust laws, and the mere agreement itself constitutes the offense.97 No 
effects ordinarily need be proved (or even occur) to support a conviction. 
To resolve this tension, Judge Gertner adopted “something akin to a ‘per 
se plus’ test, adding to the traditional domestic analysis the requirement 
that the government show substantial effects by showing a substantial 
connection to the United States market.”98 She charged the jury that they 
could find that substantial effects could be shown in any of the following 
ways: 
 whether the volume of commerce affected by the conspiracy 
was substantial; 
 whether the share of the market allegedly impacted by the 
alleged conspiracy was substantial; 
 whether the conspiracy as a whole substantially lessened 
competition in the thermal fax paper market.99  
Under this test, the jurisdictional requirement of “substantial effects” 
may be satisfied by presuming effects from sales volume, even though the 
charged conspiracy may have been wholly ineffectual in fixing (or even 
stabilizing) prices—as this one apparently was.100  
The Nippon Paper case provides a cautionary tale in the expansion of 
 95. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440-41 (1978). 
 96. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 97. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). But cf. Broad. 
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 
U.S. 756 (1999). 
 98. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 62 F. Supp. 2d at 195. 
 99. Id. The government attempted to meet this requirement by showing that defendant had $6 
million in U.S. sales and the Japanese manufacturers accounted for about 30% of the U.S. market at 
the inception of the alleged conspiracy. However, by November 1990, when the limitations period of 
the indictment began, the Japanese share of the market collapsed. 
 100. See id. at 182. Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444-45 (2d Cir. 
1945), where Judge Hand held that, once intent to affect prices in the United States was established, 
the burden shifted to defendant to prove the absence of effects. 
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extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over alleged antitrust law violations. 
One can only speculate as to why this particular case was selected for 
prosecution as the first prosecution of non-U.S. firms for acts committed 
entirely outside the United States.101 Domestic competitors had threatened 
an anti-dumping proceeding (whose only purpose was to achieve that 
which the United States charged, but failed to prove the defendants 
accomplished: reduce output and raise domestic price levels), and 
appeared to provide the government with crucial evidence of the Japanese 
firms’ allegedly unlawful response.102 The case was commenced during 
the highly-publicized “Structural Impediments Initiative,” a U.S.-Japan 
effort implemented at the impetus of U.S. firms complaining about 
obstacles to their successfully entering the Japanese market.103 The 
likelihood of a price fixing conspiracy by the Japanese fax paper 
manufacturers having any significant effect on price or output in the 
collapsing U.S. market, 70% of which was supplied by domestic firms, 
seems small. And no such effects were found at the trial, although the jury 
was permitted to infer their existence from sales volume.104 To the eye of 
the uninvolved observer, the evidence of an unlawful agreement was, at 
best, ambiguous. If there was such an agreement, it was in response to a 
particular threat and was of brief duration. In short, this was not a case in 
which incontrovertible evidence indicated a sustained effort by market 
dominating firms who intended to, and arguably did, effectively restrict 
output and raise prices in an important market, as appears to have been the 
case with the vitamin cartel.105 The wise exercise of prosecutorial 
 101. In light of Professor First’s discovery of prosecutions by Thurmond Arnold during the 1930s 
and 1940s, it appears to have been the first such case in the modern era. See First, supra note 5, at 729-
30. Judge Gertner viewed the Court of Appeals decision in Nippon Paper as “a case of first 
impression.” Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 62 F. Supp. 2d at 178. 
 102. There was the aroma of a setup in all of this by the American companies seeking not just to 
eliminate their Japanese rivals’ competitive edge, but to eliminate their Japanese rivals entirely. One of 
the attendees at the March 30, 1990 meeting, KSK, was the parent company of Kanzaki Specialty 
Papers (KSP), an American company. (KSP was considered to be an American corporation for 
anti-dumping purposes.) Hirosuke Fukuda, a KSP vice president, testified that he used KSK to get 
information about Japanese prices; KSK, in turn, directed its American company, KSP, to join with 
Appleton and threaten to file an anti-dumping petition. That, in turn, would force the Japanese 
companies to raise their prices and push them out of the market. Id. at 180 n.12. 
 103. The indictment was handed down in 1990. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 62 F. Supp. 2d at 178 
n.7. The “Structural Impediments Initiative” was active from 1989 to 1992. Harry First, Antitrust 
Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 137, 163-64 (1995). 
 104. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 62 F. Supp. 2d at 192, 195. 
 105. “The Vitamins conspirators are large, sophisticated firms that spent millions of dollars and 
thousands of employee hours to implement and hide their cartel for a decade.” Joel I. Klein, The War 
Against International Cartels: Lessons from the Battlefront, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 13, 14 (Barry 
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discretion arguably should have found a better use for the resources 
required. In retrospect, however, Nippon Paper paid its way, for it 
generated a sweeping jurisdictional precedent for the government.106  
In summary, there was a dramatic increase in prosecutions of 
international price fixing conspiracies in the last decade of the twentieth 
century, many of which charged only non-U.S. firms based on acts that 
took place outside the United States. Enormous, precedent-shattering fines 
were collected. Non-U.S. executives of non-U.S. firms served time in U.S. 
prisons. But, only one case involving a non-U.S. defendant went to trial, 
and the government ultimately lost that case, although it established a 
critical precedent. The remaining cases against non-U.S. firms were 
disposed of by plea agreements and consent judgments.  
An expansion in private civil litigation has accompanied the expansion 
in criminal cases. Some of these civil cases have resulted in settlements for 
staggering amounts, such as the nearly $1.5 billion in the vitamin cases.107 
Settlements of treble damage claims against the auction houses, Sotheby’s 
and Christie’s, have amounted to a half-billion dollars thus far.108 In fact, 
the United States has become a mecca for antitrust (and other) 
claimants.109 Notably, non-U.S. plaintiffs seeking to recover treble 
damages against non-U.S. firms often have been unsuccessful in having 
their claims adjudicated by U.S. courts.110 
Hawk ed., 1999). See generally First, supra note 5. 
 106. One still wonders why, after the Court of Appeals decision, the Antitrust Division did not 
seek a consent resolution of the “go and sin no more” variety rather than go through with an expensive, 
and ultimately losing, trial. 
 107. “On November 3, 1999, six of the main vitamins companies (Roche, BASF, Rhone-Poulenc, 
Takeda, Eisai, and Daiichi) agreed to a settlement in the private class-action litigation brought in 
federal court on behalf of direct purchasers of vitamins and vitamin premix. As befits the magnitude of 
the volume of commerce alleged in the government’s criminal complaints, the settlement was for 
$1.05 billion, the largest private antitrust price-fixing settlement in history. An additional $335 million 
settlement has also been announced in private class actions and parens patriae cases brought by 
twenty-four state attorneys general on behalf of indirect purchasers (including the states themselves). 
These cases settle damages along a distribution chain that reaches from cattle feed lots down to 
consumers of vitamin-enriched foods. Still to be disposed of are the cases brought by those who have 
chosen to opt out of the direct purchaser settlement.” First, supra note 5, at 718-19. 
 108. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. 00 CIV. 0648(LAK), 2001 WL 170792, at *10 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001). 
 109. See Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the FTAIA 
does not preclude buyers and sellers at foreign auctions from suing U.S. and foreign auction houses for 
injuries resulting from an alleged price fixing scheme that affected both U.S. and foreign auction 
sales). But see In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Md. 2001) (stating 
“a plaintiff who has not participated in the U.S. domestic market may not bring a Sherman Act claim 
under the FTAIA.”). 
 
 110. See, e.g., Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001); 
In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875 (W.D. Wis. 2000); Ronald W. Davis, International 
Cartel and Monopolization Cases Expose a Gap in Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 
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II. 
While the extension of jurisdiction over the activities of foreign entities 
to challenge activities that take place entirely outside this nation’s borders 
is the only currently viable remedy to transnational restraints of trade, it 
presents a number of problems. Several can be grouped under the general 
category of due process. These are especially acute in criminal cases111 
and administrative proceedings112 prosecuted by the competition law 
enforcement agencies. Of perhaps greatest import are the constraints of 
distance. For business executives to take time out of their normal 
responsibilities to participate in judicial or administrative proceedings 
invariably is disruptive to the corporation’s business (as well as the 
individual’s life). This is especially so when they are top management. 
That may be seen as part of the price the citizen pays for the privileges of 
living under a rule of law. However, that disruption is magnified when the 
required appearance (or discovery proceeding) is in another country, 
perhaps thousands of miles distant, with the concomitant loss of additional 
time. Disruption is a cost to a business defending itself, and at the margin, 
will affect its decision whether to defend or settle. 
The availability of witnesses who are not under the control of the 
business (former employees, customers, competitors, etc.) presents related 
problems. The same distance-related obstacles apply to both witnesses and 
executives, but the former neither are under the defendant’s control nor 
have the equivalent motivation to come to the defendant’s defense. The 
impediments of distance may well discourage an otherwise willing witness 
ANTITRUST 53 (2001). But see Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 872 F. Supp. 52 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), modified, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a complaint by a non-U.S. 
carrier alleging various “predatory acts” in trans-Atlantic air travel scheduling and pricing by 
defendant non-U.S. carrier that allegedly harm competition and consumers in the United States is 
justiciable even though any relief granted would have an extraterritorial effect). In Virgin Atlantic, 
plaintiff lost on the merits of its case, not on jurisdictional or comity grounds. 871 F. Supp. 52. 
 111. Few nations other than the United States impose criminal sanctions for violations of their 
competition laws. See, e.g., Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 45.1 (1985) (Can.) (“imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding five years or . . . a fine not exceeding ten million dollars or both”); 
Antimonopoly Law §§ 89-100 (penal servitude up to three years; fines up to 5 million yen). 
 112. Although the European Commission does not have criminal sanctions, it may impose 
substantial fines against violators of Articles 81 or 82 of the Treaty. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY 
& GRAHAM CHILD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF COMPETITION § 12-075 (3d ed. 2001) (“[t]he 
fines imposed may range . . . up to a maximum of i 1 million or 10 per cent of [the prior year’s] 
turnover, whichever is greater.”). For a recent example, see Press Release, European Commission, 
Commission Fines Eight Companies in Graphite Electrode Cartel (July 18, 2001), available at 
http://europa.eu.int (reporting that fines totaling i 218.8 million were assessed against eight companies, 
two of which are U.S. firms and four of which are Japanese) [hereinafter Commission Fines Eight 
Companies]. 
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from participating in the proceedings. Compulsory process available for a 
witness within the jurisdiction where the proceedings are under way 
normally is not available to compel attendance by a non-national residing 
outside the country.113 And, as the problems encountered with the 
“government’s star witness” in the Nippon Paper trial demonstrate,114 
even contemporary technology does not provide a satisfactory solution. 
The government, moreover, possesses an advantage not available to the 
defendant in this regard. It can negotiate cooperation with the government 
of the defendant’s home nation to facilitate the prosecution. These extant 
cooperation agreements115 do not contemplate assistance to defendants. 
Finally, under the general heading of due process, one must include 
xenophobia or the fear of it. This was the motivation for adding to the 
Constitution the Sixth Amendment requirement that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, . . .”116 A foreign defendant’s concern that it may suffer 
disadvantage before a domestic tribunal, especially where the effective 
decision maker is a jury or similar lay body, is hardly irrational.117 Add to 
these problems the inevitable confusion resulting from differences in 
language and culture118 and it becomes evident that a foreign defendant 
confronts a significant set of obstacles to defending itself and obtaining 
due process of law.  
One of the arguments offered in support of the Antitrust Division’s 
aggressive prosecution of foreign corporations and individuals for acts that 
took place outside of the United States is that all of these cases have 
involved price fixing agreements, which are unlawful under every 
 113. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e)(2) (“[a] subpoena directed to a witness in a foreign country shall 
issue under the circumstances and in the manner and be served as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., 
§ 1783.” The statute provides for service of a subpoena outside the United States upon a citizen or 
resident of the United States. See John D. Perovich, Annotation, Subpoena, Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1783, 
of Persons in Foreign Countries, 32 A.L.R. FED. 894 (1977). Aliens resident in a foreign country do 
not fall within the scope of Section 1783. Id. § 5. 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89. 
 115. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
 116. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). Article III, Section 2 already provided that “(t)he 
Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes 
shall have been committed.” The geographical limitation added by the amendment was a compromise 
between the common law requirement of a jury of the vicinage and absolute legislative discretion as to 
the location of a trial. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92-96 (1970). 
 117. As the retrial in Nippon Paper illustrated, a U.S. jury’s “shared perceptions,” from which it is 
expected to draw inferences about a defendant’s conduct, may well be different from those of a 
defendant from a foreign cultural environment. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. 
 118. Cf. supra text accompanying note 88. The government’s and the defendant’s translators 
provided different meanings for a critical word in the Nippon Paper trial. 
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competition law and universally are deplored as adversely affecting 
consumer welfare.119 This prosecutorial rhetoric suggests that price fixing 
and related agreements represent a contemporary version of mala in se. 
Many economists agree, but not all policymakers and their political 
supporters do. Every competition law regime is likely to include 
exceptions that permit cartels under certain circumstances, and often these 
cartels are backed by official compulsion. The United States certainly has 
its share, including the insurance industry,120 large segments of agriculture, 
and, of particular relevance here, international trade. 
The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918121 permits competitors to agree on 
price, quantity, market division, etc.—i.e., to form export cartels—
immune from antitrust concerns so long as they only agree as to exports 
and file their agreements with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
Concerned that Webb-Pomerene cartels were not sufficiently successful, 
Congress enacted the Export Trading Act of 1982,122 which broadened the 
immunity enjoyed by export cartels, provided they received a certificate 
from the Secretary of Commerce (with the concurrence of the Attorney 
General). Neither act provides immunity from proceedings brought by 
other nations for violations of their competition laws.123 The European 
Court of Justice’s (ECJ) decision in the Woodpulp case, for example, gave 
no significance to the fact that some of the agreements at issue were 
Webb-Pomerene agreements. The court noted that “the U.S. antitrust 
authorities had been informed of the proceedings at an early stage, and had 
not objected to them.”124  
It seems inconsistent for the United States to visit criminal penalties on 
firms and individuals of other nations for engaging in conduct (export 
cartels) that U.S. law expressly permits and to which federal agencies are 
required by law to be party. Of course, the United States is not alone in 
permitting competitors to engage in restraints of trade exclusively 
 119. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 105, at 14: “[C]artels are the equivalent of theft by well-dressed 
thieves,” and “people all over the world have come to realize that cartels . . . are a true scourge of the 
world economy.” See also OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action 
Against Hard Core Cartels pmbl. (Apr. 28, 1998): “[H]ard core cartels are the most egregious 
violations of competition law and . . . they injure consumers in many countries by raising prices and 
restricting supply, thus making goods and services completely unavailable to some purchasers and 
unnecessarily expensive for others . . . ” 
 120. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000). 
 121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (2000). 
 122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003, 4011-4021 (2000). 
 123. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for 
International Operations ¶ 3.1 (1995). 
 
 124. Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85, 125/85, 126/85, 127/85, 128/85, 129/85, 
A. Åhlström Osakeyhtiö & Others v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193. 
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affecting exports. And, there is no evidence the United States has sought 
to protect Webb-Pomerene or Export Trading associations from 
proceedings alleging violation of another nation’s competition laws. 
Suppose, however, a country that the United States had a cooperation 
agreement with, such as Australia, seeks assistance from the United States 
in proceedings against a U.S. export association. Will the Antitrust 
Division cooperate with the Australian enforcement authority proceeding 
against a group of American firms possessing an export trade certificate 
issued by the Secretary of Commerce and approved by the Attorney 
General (i.e., the Antitrust Division)?125 One certainly can expect political 
pressure from association members and their allies, including members of 
Congress and perhaps the Department of Commerce, to dissuade the 
antitrust enforcers from cooperating. The United States could invoke the 
“public interest” provisions of the International Antitrust Enforcement 
Assistance Act of 1994,126 the umbrella statute authorizing cooperation 
agreements, as a basis for non-cooperation. 
The U.S. position on the effect of imports on U.S. industries, whether 
they are major industries like steel127 or less economically significant ones 
like broom corn brooms,128 also seems at odds with the policies marshaled 
in support of the prosecution of foreign cartels. The anti-dumping 
provisions of the Trade Act, which triggered the meetings among Japanese 
fax paper manufacturers, already have been noted.129 Under the Tariff Act 
of 1930,130 if the Commerce Department finds that imported products are 
being sold in the United States at less than “fair value”131 and a U.S. 
industry is or might be “materially injured,” the Department is authorized 
to impose countervailing tariffs on those products, which effectively raise 
 125. See Geralyn Trujillo, Mutual Assistance Under the International Antitrust Enforcement 
Assistance Act: Obstacles to a United States-Japanese Agreement, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 613, 626 (1998): 
“U.S. antitrust authorities may be unwilling to aid a foreign antitrust authority in its investigation of a 
U.S. export cartel . . ., especially if the cartel serves an important economic objective and does not 
have an anticompetitive effect on the U.S. economy.”  
 126. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act § 8(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 6207(a)(3) (1994). 
 127. See Public Comments on Potential Action Under Section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 With 
Regard to Imports of Certain Steel, 66 Fed. Reg. 54321 (Oct. 26, 2001). 
 128. See Press Release, United States International Trade Commission, Presidential 
Determinations Under Section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 304 of the North American 
Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act Concerning Broom Corn Brooms (Sept. 3, 1996), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1996/09/96-68.html. 
 129. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
 130. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2001). 
 131. The determination of “fair value” is complex and leaves ample room for the exercise of 
discretion by the Commerce Department. See, e.g., AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1361 
(Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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domestic prices. In addition, acting under Section 203 of the Trade Act,132 
the President, on the recommendation of the International Trade 
Commission, may impose import quotas and punitive tariffs on a 
commodity on the sole grounds that U.S. producers are unable to compete 
with imports.133 No showing of “dumping” or predatory pricing is 
required. Output thereby is reduced, prices are increased, inefficient firms 
are protected, and competition and consumers are harmed, all the evils 
attributed to cartels, but in this case it is done lawfully—by Presidential 
mandate. But, if Japanese steel manufacturers, for example, were to agree 
among themselves to reduce exports to the United States in order to 
forestall action pursuant to an anti-dumping proceeding or under Section 
203, they would be subject to prosecution under the Sherman Act. On the 
other hand, should the foreign steel producers enter into an agreement with 
the Secretary of Commerce that they would restrict imports into the United 
States, provided the President refrained from issuing a Section 201 order, 
they implicitly might be immune from prosecution.134  
III. 
Thus far, the United States has been the most aggressive in expanding 
the reach of its antitrust laws. But, given the increasingly global nature of 
business activity, the rapid embracing of market economy principles, the 
realization that international law jurisdictional principles pose no 
significant obstacle to extraterritoriality, and the understandable desire of 
other nations to protect their citizens from the adverse effects of 
international cartels, there is every reason to expect other nations to 
reciprocate.135 
 132. Trade Act of 1974 § 203, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (2001). 
 133. Of course the criterion is not quite so baldly stated in official documents, but nearly so:  
Sections 201-204 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes [sic] the President of the United States to 
take action when a particular product is being imported into the country in such large quantities as 
to cause injury or threaten serious injury to a domestic industry. This authority can be used even if 
the import is not priced unfairly.  
International Trade Data System, Sections 201-204 of the Trade Act of 1974 (last updated Mar. 12, 
2002), available at http://www.itds.treas.gov/sec201.htm (emphasis added). 
 134. See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 123, ¶ 3.4 Ex. 
M. 
 135. See Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 
ANTITRUST L. J. 159 (1999):  
Extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust and competition laws has become routine in both the 
United States and the European Union. Enforcement authorities on both sides of the Atlantic 
vigorously enforce their competition laws against conduct outside their borders to protect their 
consumers and markets. In many respects, the theories of jurisdiction espoused by U.S. and EU 
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Indeed, some already have done so. The most notable is the European 
Community (EC), which has construed the jurisdictional language in 
Article 81 (formerly Article 85) of the Treaty of Rome, “may affect trade 
between member states,” to reach non-EC firms.136 The ECJ first 
embraced the extraterritorial concept in ICI v. Commission,137 in which it 
upheld the Commission’s imposition of a fine against ICI (a British firm 
with continental subsidiaries) for assisting a price fixing cartel and thereby 
producing effects in the EC. In the Woodpulp case in 1988,138 the ECJ 
affirmed the Commission’s exercise of jurisdiction over members of a 
cartel, none of which were EC firms. The defendants argued that the 
Commission incorrectly had based its decision on the “effects” doctrine. 
The Advocate General argued that reliance on the “effects” doctrine was 
appropriate so long as the effects in the member countries were 
“substantial, direct, and foreseeable.” However, the ECJ eschewed the 
term “effects,” concluding instead that an anticompetitive agreement 
entered into outside the EC subjected the actor to EC jurisdiction if the 
“implementation” of the agreement took place within the Community. 
Whether “implementation” is less broad than the effects doctrine has been 
a matter of controversy.139 The Court of First Instance in a recent decision 
under the Merger Regulation relied expressly upon the “effects” 
doctrine,140 but whether that approach will be adopted by the ECJ or will 
be extended to non-merger situations remains to be seen.141 The current 
EC Commissioner for Competition has taken a strong position regarding 
competition enforcement officials are converging and cooperation is increasing; however, 
aggressive unilateral enforcement continues to provoke conflicts among close trading partners and 
to create uncertainty for transnational firms.  
Events since Griffin’s article was published have confirmed the validity of his statement. See BBC, US 
and EU Clash on Competition (June 21, 2001), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/ 
newsid_1398000/1398718.stm. 
 136. Kevin Coates & John Finnegan, Intellectual Property, in THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 600-
01 (Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay eds., 1999). 
 137. Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 619. Britain did 
not become a member of the EC until 1973. See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 3, at 14-15. 
 138. Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85, 125/85, 126/85, 127/85, 128/85, 129/85, 
A. Åhlström Osakeyhtiö & Others v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193. 
 139. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 74, at 513 (“[t]he distinction between ‘effects’ and 
‘implementation’ leads to different results in a narrow, but significant, group of cases.”); VALENTINE 
KORAH, 1 COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY § 1.05 (2000) (“[i]t was not clear 
whether a foreigner could be fined for making an agreement to keep out of the common market.”). 
 140. Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. II-753, ¶ 90 (“[a]pplication of the 
Regulation is justified under public international law when it is foreseeable that a proposed 
concentration will have an immediate and substantial effect in the Community.”). 
 141. Coates & Finnegan, supra note 136, at 600. 
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non-EC firms in the areas of merger enforcement142 and abuse of a 
dominant position.143 The EC recently has imposed substantial fines 
against non-EC firms for participating in cartels with EC firms,144 and has 
established in Woodpulp, as glossed by Gencor, the jurisdictional basis for 
aggressively pursuing non-EC cartels as well. 
Germany appears to have been foremost among the member states of 
the EC to embrace extraterritorially. The German antitrust statute codifies 
the “effects” principle: “this statute applies to all restraints of competition 
which have an effect within the territorial scope of the statute, even when 
they are caused outside the territorial scope of the statute.”145 
Nevertheless, the application of the principle against non-German firms 
thus far has been limited in practice to mergers that would affect 
Germany.146 It has not been invoked against non-German cartels or other 
extraterritorial anticompetitive acts. 
Outside the EC, Canada has been most assertive in recent decades, 
moving generally from the traditional narrow territorial limitations 
inherited from Great Britain to the view that “[t]his country has a 
legitimate interest in prosecuting persons for activities that take place 
abroad but have an unlawful consequence here, . . .”147 As Professor First 
has described,148 Canada cooperated with the United States in the vitamin 
litigation and assessed high fines against German, Swiss, and Japanese 
firms in those and related cases.149 Other nations with well-developed 
competition laws, such as Japan150 and Australia,151 have not yet extended 
 142. See Mario Monti, The Future for Competition Policy in the European Union, Speech at 
Merchant Taylor’s Hall (July 9, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/ 
index_2001.html. 
 143. See Mario Monti, Competition in the New Economy, Speech at the 10th International 
Conference on Competition (May 21, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ 
speeches/index_2001.html. See also Victorya Hong, Microsoft, EU Enter Pivotal Period (Oct. 15, 
2001), available at http://www.thedeal.com. 
 144. See, e.g., Commission Fines Eight Companies, supra note 112 (U.S. and Japanese firms); 
Press Release, European Commission, Commission Fines Six Companies in Sodium Gluconate Cartel 
(Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int (U.S. and Japanese firms). 
 145. Bekanntmachung der Neufassung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [Law 
Against Restraints on Competition], 1990 Bundesgesetzblatt, § 130 (BGB1. I 235). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 (Can.), ¶ 67. The opinion surveys the history and 
policies underlying the concept of territorial jurisdiction. 
 148. First, supra note 5, at 718. 
 149. See Canadian Court Metes Out Record Fines in Vitamin and Food Additive Cartel Cases, 77 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 353 (Sept. 23, 1999); Canadian Court Levies $5.2 Million 
Fine in Vitamins Price-Fixing Conspiracy Case, 78 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 259 (Mar. 
10, 2000); Firm Gets Multi-Million Dollar Fine for Participation in Feed Additive Cartel, 77 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 374 (Sept. 30, 1999). 
 150. See 1 COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, Japan, ch. 2, 72 (H. Stephen 
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their reach beyond their territorial borders. It would be surprising if they 
did not do so in the near future. These disparate countries with different 
interests and competition law traditions hardly are likely to apply precisely 
the same criteria in adjudging violations. Therefore, the potential of 
inconsistent outcomes exists. Concerns already are being expressed about 
the plethora of jurisdictions enforcing conflicting standards in the merger 
area.  
IV. 
As there currently is no international competition enforcement regime, 
the only alternative for a nation seeking to protect its consumers from the 
adverse effects of international cartels is to apply its own municipal 
competition law in its own courts. The predictable duplication of 
enforcement, inconsistencies, conflicts, costs, and inefficiencies that result 
from each nation’s proceeding unilaterally provide strong arguments for a 
deliberate move in the direction of international enforcement. It is, 
however, unlikely that an effective international regime could be 
established in the near future. Although the intertwining of competition 
law with trade issues suggests that the WTO might be the appropriate 
umbrella for such a regime,152 there are sound reasons for rejecting that 
approach.153 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) encompasses most of the industrialized nations and 
has taken a strong position against international cartels.154 Thus, it might 
seem an appropriate institution for international competition law. But the 
OECD is a forum for developing and recommending economic policy, and 
it lacks legislative, adjudicatory, or enforcement authority.155 The OECD 
could, on the other hand, provide a means of cooperation and coordination 
in the enforcement of national laws, thereby potentionally reducing some 
Harris et al. eds., 2001). 
 151. See 2 COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, Australia, ch. 9, 97 (H. Stephen 
Harris et al. eds., 2001). The Australian Trade Practices Act does provide for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over mergers of non-Australian firms that might have the effect of substantially lessening 
competition in an Australian market. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 50A (Austl.). 
 152 See, e.g., Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement, 
65 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1628 (Special Supp. Aug. 19, 1993). 
 153. See Final Report, supra note 30, at 249-51, 282-83. 
 154. See OECD, supra note 119. 
 155. OECD, The OECD: What is it?, Overview of the OECD, at http://www.oecd.org (“[t]he 
OECD groups 30 member countries in a unique forum to discuss, develop and refine economic and 
social policies.”) The OECD does sometimes develop “soft law,” as in, for example, its 
“Recommendation . . . Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels.” See generally OECD, 
supra note 119. 
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of the problems discussed above. To the extent that national laws become 
more congruent, as a result of OECD-facilitated cooperation or otherwise, 
the potential for inconsistent outcomes may be reduced. However, 
experience to date indicates that such international cooperation has been at 
the behest of enforcement agencies seeking to improve the means of 
enforcing their respective competition laws, and has had no evident effect 
on protecting the interests of potential defendants.156  
We are left with the prospect of relying on prosecutorial discretion, 
potentially informed by diplomatic and comity issues, to minimize 
transnational conflicts, duplication of enforcement, and unfairness to 
foreign individuals and entities. The Nippon Paper case provides reasons 
to be concerned with the lack of institutional safeguards against the abuse 
of such discretion.157 
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34, 115. The proposed International Competition 
Network, on the other hand, holds out the prospect of reducing analogous problems facing firms 
seeking to merge. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. and Foreign Antitrust Officials 
Launch International Competition Network (Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
public/press_releases/2001/9400.htm. 
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 77-106. Moreover, in the United States, many of the 
same problems may arise in the context of private treble damage litigation, where neither prosecutorial 
discretion nor comity constrains the initiation and prosecution of punitive litigation. See, e.g., Kruman 
v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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